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Category 14(b) 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In order for plaintiff to prevail on his motion for 
summary judgment on defendants' alleged breach of the employment 
contract, plaintiff must first establish his own performance under 
the contract. Defendants submitted substantial evidence to the 
trial court demonstrating that plaintiff breached the employment 
contract. Once evidence of a potential breach on the part of 
plaintiff was introduced, the trial court should not have entered 
judgment in favor of plaintiff as a matter of law. 
While corporate financial documents may constitute 
admissions against interest, such admissions are insufficient to 
support the entry of judgment on a contested debt. The documents 
relied upon by plaintiff to establish the contested debt did not 
take into consideration possible defenses R.O.A. might have in an 
- i -
action on the alleged employment contract debt. 
Furthermore, defendants submitted parol evidence which was 
improperly disregarded by the trial court. Substantial evidence 
exists that the parties' agreement did not reflect the entire 
understanding between the parties. In addition, evidence of the 
parties' conduct indicated that the employment contract was never 
intended to be a binding integration. As a result, the trial 
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED AS 
TO PLAINTIFF'S PERFORMANCE UNDER THE 
SUBJECT CONTRACT. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Lowe v. Rosenlof, 12 Utah 2d 
190, 364 P.2d 418 (1961), recognized that a party suing for breach 
of contract must first establish his own performance under the con-
tract as a condition precedent to the entry of judgment in his 
favor. Plaintiff in the instant appeal simply contends that 
R.O.A.'s argument that he breached the parties' employment contract 
requirement that he devote his "best efforts, skill, and experience 
in connection with his employment" to R.O.A. cannot be taken 
seriously. While plaintiff denies any such breach, defendants sub-
mitted substantial evidence to the trial court substantiating their 
claims that plaintiff breached the employment contract. 
The record on appeal demonstrates that plaintiff testified 
that he spent substantial amounts of time working on his own adver-
tising projects while on company time. (R. 1022 at p. 18; R. 1025 
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at pp. 35-37). In addition, defendants submitted affidavits from 
others personally acquainted with plaintiff who observed 
plaintiff's frequent absences from the office of R.O.A., his fre-
quent handling of only private matters during company time, and his 
frequent non-involvement in the day-to-day operations of R.O.A. 
(R. 868-69). Furthermore, the trial court had before it evidence 
that Webb had failed on at least two occasions to perform specific 
tasks required of him by a member of the board of directors of 
R.O.A., William K. Reagan. (R. 881-84). 
While the trial court's minute entry found that 
"defendants' defenses based upon plaintiff's breach of the employ-
ment agreement cannot be seriously considered in the face of 
defendants' admissions," that is not the appropriate standard for 
granting summary judgment. (R. 937). Rather, the well-established 
standard for the granting of summary judgment under Rule 56 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is that the contentions of the party 
opposing the motion for summary judgment must be considered in a 
light most advantageous to him and all doubts must be resolved in 
favor of permitting the matter to be submitted to the trier of 
fact. Controlled Receivables, Inc. v. Harmen, 17 Utah 2d 420, 413 
P.2d 807 (1966). The trial court committed reversible error in 
apparently not "seriously considering" the existence of material 
factual disputes in the record. Once the trial court had evidence 
of plaintiff's alleged breach of contract the court erred in 
granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff. 
Since defendants produced evidence tending to show that 
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Webb breached his duties under the employment contract, the court 
should have also submitted the determination of the materiality of 
plaintiff's alleged breach to the trier of fact. Ordinarily, the 
determination of whether a material breach has occurred is a ques-
tion of fact for the jury to determine. See Sjober v. Kravik, 759 
P.2d 966, 969 (Mont. 1988); McDuffy, Edwards & Associates, Inc. v. 
Peripheral Systems, Inc., 93 Or.App. 226, 762 P.2d 299, 302 (1988). 
As a result, the actions of the trial court in granting summary 
judgment in favor of plaintiff must be reversed. 
POINT II. 
THE ALLEGED ADMISSIONS CONTAINED IN 
R.O.A.fS FINANCIAL STATEMENTS ARE 
INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER OF LAW TO SUPPORT 
THE ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF 
PLAINTIFF. 
While defendants acknowledge that a corporation's finan-
cial statements may be viewed as an admission against interest, 
the financial statements relied upon by plaintiff do not entitle 
him to a judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiff contends, and the 
trial court erroneously agreed, that the alle-3d admissions con-
tained in R.O.A.'s financial statements and correspondence are suf-
ficient to support the entry of judgment against R.O.A. as a matter 
of law. Plaintiff cites this court to several cases as support for 
his proposition that "the courts that have addressed similar fact 
situations have consistently required parties to abide by their own 
financial statements concerning debts owed and have found such 
evidence sufficient to support summary judgment." Respondent's 
Brief at p. 9 (emphasis added). However, none of the cited cases 
establish that a financial statement by itself is sufficient to 
warrant the entry of summary judgment on an alleged debt. In fact, 
only one of the cited cases, Buxton v. Diversified Resources Corp., 
634 F.2d 1313, 1319 (10th Cir. 1980), even involves a motion for 
summary judgment. Furthermore, the issue in Buxton was not whether 
the financial statement established the debt as a matter of law, 
but whether the financial statement amounted to an acknowledgement 
of the debt in order to revive the plaintiff's cause of action for 
a debt discharged by the statute of limitations. Defendants are 
unaware of any cases, and plaintiff fails to cite this court to any 
cases, that establish that a journal entry in a corporation's 
financial statement is sufficent by itself to entitle a party as a 
matter of law to a judgment on a contested debt. 
It is important to note that the evidence plaintiff relies 
upon consists largely of financial statements prepared by account-
ing and auditing personnel. Such statements undoubtedly were pre-
pared without reference or knowledge of any potential legal 
defenses that R.O.A. might have to plaintiff's claims under the 
employment contract. The financial statements and correspondence 
plaintiff relies upon are silent on the issues relating to 
plaintiff's alleged breach of the employment contract and the 
dispute between the parties regarding the very meaning of 
plaintiff's employment contract. While such statements may be 
viewed as admissions against interest as to the potential maximum 
exposure of the corporation to plaintiff's employment contract 
claim, such statements, when viewed in the context of the entire 
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evidence before the trial court, was insufficient to warrant the 
entry of judgment as a matter of law in favor of plaintiff. As a 
result, the actions of the trial court in granting summary judgment 
in favor of plaintiff on the employment contract must be reversed. 
POINT III, 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING PAROL 
EVIDENCE THAT CREATED GENUINE ISSUES OF 
MATERIAL FACT. 
Defendants properly submitted parol evidence to the trial 
court to establish that the employment agreement was not an inte-
grated contract. It is well established that the parol evidence 
rule applies only to integrated contracts. Eie v. St. Benedict's 
Hospital, 638 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah 1981). In considering the 
admissibility of parol evidence, the trial court must first make a 
preliminary or foundational determination of whether the contract 
is integrated. Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larsen Bros. Constr., 7 31 
P.2d 483, 487 (Utah 1986). It should be noted that the trial 
court in this case made no such finding. 
The evidence submitted by defendants was improperly disre-
garded in the court's resolution of plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment. The affidavit submitted by plaintiff established that 
the parties understood and agreed that the employment contract com-
pensation provisions were subject to unwritten conditions and 
terms. (R. 76-78, 881-84). Furthermore, the parties' undisputed 
course of conduct suggested that the parties did not intend the 
two-page employment contract to contain the entire agreement 
between them. Indeed, it is interesting to note that the parties 
apparently on at least one occasion amended the employment 
agreement. (R. 51-52). As a result, the trial court had evidence 
that the parties never intended the employment agreement to be an 
integrated contract. Once a factual issue was raised as to whether 
the contract was intended to be a binding integration, the granting 
of summary judgment was improper. Colonial Leasing, 731 P.2d at 
487. 
The parol evidence submitted by defendants was further 
admissible to establish a genuine issue of material fact concerning 
the existence of a condition precedent. Defendants' evidence dem-
onstrated that the parties clearly understood and agreed that 
R.O.A. must turn a profit and have sufficient cash available to it 
before a portion of the employment contract's compensation provi-
sion became effective. Such evidence goes to the very existence of 
the "additional compensation" provision under the parties' 
contract. The affidavits submitted by defendants in opposition to 
plaintiff's motion for summary judgment contained admissible parol 
evidence that created genuine issues of material fact. At a 
minimum, the affidavits supported the affirmative defenses of 
waiver and estoppel that should have been submitted to the trier of 
fact in order to determine whether plaintiff by his acts or conduct 
should have been prevented from denying the actual intent of the 
parties to the employment contract. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, defendants respectfully request 
that the actions of the trial court in granting plaintiff's motion 
for summary judgment be reversed and remanded for resolution by the 
trier of fact. * 
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